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237 lines
9.1 KiB
Go
237 lines
9.1 KiB
Go
package notify
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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// 本文件是不变量测试：**任何**从渠道实现里冒出来的错误文本都不得携带凭据。
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//
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// 为什么单独拉一个文件：最初的渠道用例只覆盖了成功路径与平台业务错误，
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// 完全没看传输层失败。而恰恰是传输层错误（连接被拒/DNS 失败/超时）最危险——
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// http.Client.Do 返回的 *url.Error 会把**完整 URL** 打进错误文本，而本功能
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// 这几家的凭据就在 URL 里。凭据顺着这条串流到了四个出口：
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//
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// notification_deliveries.last_error → 明文落库
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// GET /api/notify/deliveries 响应 → 绕过渠道配置的掩码，回显给浏览器
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// 服务端日志 → 常被外发留存
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// 测试发送接口的 502 响应 → 直接弹在前端
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//
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// 所以这里不只测一个函数，而是逐个渠道真发一次必然失败的请求，断言错误文本
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// 里找不到那个凭据。
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// credentialCases 覆盖所有「凭据在 URL 里」的渠道形态：
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// 钉钉/企微在 query，飞书在路径末段，Telegram 在路径中段。
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var credentialCases = []struct {
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name string
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ch Channel
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cfg map[string]any
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secret string
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}{
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{
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name: "钉钉 access_token 在 query",
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ch: dingTalkChannel{},
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cfg: map[string]any{"webhook": "http://127.0.0.1:1/robot/send?access_token=" + leakProbeToken},
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secret: leakProbeToken,
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},
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{
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name: "企业微信 key 在 query",
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ch: weComChannel{},
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cfg: map[string]any{"webhook": "http://127.0.0.1:1/cgi-bin/webhook/send?key=" + leakProbeToken},
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secret: leakProbeToken,
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},
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{
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name: "飞书 hook id 在路径末段",
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ch: feishuChannel{},
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cfg: map[string]any{"webhook": "http://127.0.0.1:1/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/" + leakProbeToken},
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secret: leakProbeToken,
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},
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{
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name: "Telegram bot token 在路径中段",
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ch: telegramChannel{},
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cfg: map[string]any{"bot_token": leakProbeToken, "chat_id": "1", "base_url": "http://127.0.0.1:1"},
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secret: leakProbeToken,
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},
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{
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name: "钉钉加签密钥",
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ch: dingTalkChannel{},
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cfg: map[string]any{"webhook": "http://127.0.0.1:1/robot/send", "secret": leakProbeToken},
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secret: leakProbeToken,
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},
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}
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// leakProbeToken 是一个绝不可能是真实凭据的哨兵值，用于在错误文本里搜它。
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const leakProbeToken = "LEAKPROBE0123456789abcdef"
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// TestChannelErrorsNeverLeakCredentials 是核心不变量。
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func TestChannelErrorsNeverLeakCredentials(t *testing.T) {
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for _, tc := range credentialCases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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// 必然失败的对端：127.0.0.1:1 无人监听，走的是连接被拒这条路径。
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_, err := tc.ch.Send(context.Background(), tc.cfg, Message{
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Items: []Item{{FindingID: 1, Severity: "high", Name: "泄露探针"}},
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})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("对不可达地址应报错")
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}
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assertNoSecret(t, err.Error(), tc.secret)
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})
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}
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}
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// TestChannelErrorsNeverLeakCredentialsInPermanentPath 覆盖永久失败分支：
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// URL 校验失败、平台业务错误等也会把错误文本外传，同样不能带凭据。
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func TestChannelErrorsNeverLeakCredentialsInPermanentPath(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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ch Channel
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cfg map[string]any
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}{
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// 地址里带凭据但格式非法 → 触发 validateHTTPURL / url.Parse 分支。
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{"钉钉地址非法", dingTalkChannel{}, map[string]any{"webhook": "file:///" + leakProbeToken}},
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{"企微地址非法", weComChannel{}, map[string]any{"webhook": "gopher://" + leakProbeToken}},
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{"飞书地址非法", feishuChannel{}, map[string]any{"webhook": "ftp://" + leakProbeToken + "/hook"}},
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{"Telegram API 地址非法", telegramChannel{}, map[string]any{"bot_token": "tok", "chat_id": "1", "base_url": "file://" + leakProbeToken}},
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{"通用 Webhook 地址非法", webhookChannel{}, map[string]any{"url": "javascript:" + leakProbeToken}},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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_, err := tc.ch.Send(context.Background(), tc.cfg, Message{Items: []Item{{Severity: "high"}}})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("非法配置应报错")
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}
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assertNoSecret(t, err.Error(), leakProbeToken)
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})
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}
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}
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func assertNoSecret(t *testing.T, text, secret string) {
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t.Helper()
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if strings.Contains(text, secret) {
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t.Fatalf("错误文本泄露了凭据 %q:\n %s", secret, text)
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}
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}
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func TestRedactRequestTargetKeepsOnlySchemeAndHost(t *testing.T) {
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cases := map[string]string{
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"https://oapi.dingtalk.com/robot/send?access_token=S1": "https://oapi.dingtalk.com/…",
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"https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/webhook/send?key=S2": "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/…",
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"https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/S3": "https://open.feishu.cn/…",
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"https://api.telegram.org/botS4/sendMessage": "https://api.telegram.org/…",
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"http://10.0.0.5:8080/hook": "http://10.0.0.5:8080/…",
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}
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for in, want := range cases {
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got := redactRequestTarget(in)
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if got != want {
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t.Errorf("redactRequestTarget(%q) = %q，期望 %q", in, got, want)
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}
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// 脱敏结果本身不得再含有原地址的任何路径/查询片段。
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if parts := strings.SplitN(in, "://", 2); len(parts) == 2 {
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if hostAndRest := strings.SplitN(parts[1], "/", 2); len(hostAndRest) == 2 && hostAndRest[1] != "" {
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if strings.Contains(got, hostAndRest[1]) {
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t.Errorf("脱敏后仍含路径/查询片段 %q: %q", hostAndRest[1], got)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// 不可解析的输入绝不回显原串。
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for _, bad := range []string{"", "://", "not a url", "http://"} {
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if got := redactRequestTarget(bad); strings.Contains(got, bad) && bad != "" {
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t.Errorf("不可解析输入 %q 被回显为 %q", bad, got)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestRedactTransportErrorStripsURL 直接盯住 *url.Error 这个具体类型：
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// 它是 http.Client.Do 的返回类型，也是泄露的第一现场。
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func TestRedactTransportErrorStripsURL(t *testing.T) {
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inner := errors.New("dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect: connection refused")
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uerr := &url.Error{
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Op: "Post",
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URL: "https://api.telegram.org/bot" + leakProbeToken + "/sendMessage",
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Err: inner,
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}
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got := redactTransportError(uerr)
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assertNoSecret(t, got, leakProbeToken)
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if !strings.Contains(got, "api.telegram.org") {
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t.Errorf("应保留 host 以便排查，得到 %q", got)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(got, "connection refused") {
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t.Errorf("应保留底层原因以便排查，得到 %q", got)
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}
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// Op 也要保留（POST 还是 GET 对排查有意义）。
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if !strings.Contains(got, "Post") {
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t.Errorf("应保留操作名，得到 %q", got)
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}
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}
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// TestRedactURLsInTextHandlesFallback 兜底路径：非 *url.Error 的自定义错误
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// （如重定向策略返回的错误）里的地址同样要被摘掉。
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func TestRedactURLsInTextHandlesFallback(t *testing.T) {
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in := fmt.Sprintf("拒绝跨主机重定向（a.example → http://b.example/bot%s/send）", leakProbeToken)
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got := redactURLsInText(in)
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assertNoSecret(t, got, leakProbeToken)
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if !strings.Contains(got, "http://b.example/…") {
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t.Errorf("应把地址替换为脱敏形态，得到 %q", got)
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}
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// 不含地址的文本原样保留。
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if plain := "dial tcp: connection refused"; redactURLsInText(plain) != plain {
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t.Error("不含地址的文本不应被改动")
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}
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}
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// TestCrossHostRedirectRefused 覆盖「凭据在 URL 里 + 跟随跨主机跳转 = 交出凭据」。
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// httptest 的两个服务监听在 127.0.0.1 的不同端口，端口不同即 Host 不同，
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// 正好构成跨主机跳转。
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func TestCrossHostRedirectRefused(t *testing.T) {
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var hit bool
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target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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hit = true
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_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"errcode":0,"errmsg":"ok"}`)
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}))
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defer target.Close()
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redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL+"/robot/send?access_token="+leakProbeToken, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
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}))
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defer redirector.Close()
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_, err := (dingTalkChannel{}).Send(context.Background(),
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map[string]any{"webhook": redirector.URL + "/robot/send?access_token=" + leakProbeToken},
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Message{Items: []Item{{Severity: "high"}}})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("跨主机重定向应被拒绝")
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}
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if hit {
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t.Fatal("跳转目标被访问了——凭据已随重定向外泄")
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}
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assertNoSecret(t, err.Error(), leakProbeToken)
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}
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// TestSameHostRedirectAllowed 反向用例：同主机跳转（如末尾补斜杠）必须仍然可用，
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// 否则会把正常工作流一起挡掉。
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func TestSameHostRedirectAllowed(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path == "/robot/send" {
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// 同主机、同端口的跳转。
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/robot/send/", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
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return
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}
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_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"errcode":0,"errmsg":"ok"}`)
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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if _, err := (dingTalkChannel{}).Send(context.Background(),
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map[string]any{"webhook": srv.URL + "/robot/send"},
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Message{Items: []Item{{Severity: "high"}}}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("同主机重定向不应被拒绝: %v", err)
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}
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}
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